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.  “[A’del] has no visitor save his lawyers. He has no news in his native language, 
Uighur. He cannot speak to his wife, his children, his parents. When I first met him on 
July 15, in a grim place they call Camp Echo, his leg was chained to the floor. I brought 
photographs of his children to another visit, but I had to take them away again. They were 
‘contraband,’ and he was forbidden to receive them from me.”1  A’del Abdu Al-Hakim is 
one of the many prisoners detained unlawfully under the new rules of the Bush 
Administration’s “War on Terrorism”.2  Al- Hakim, along with a fellow Uighur detainee 
Abu Bakker Qassim, are among the innocent at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base.3  Both men 
went in front of a military tribunal, plead not guilty, and were found innocent.  The 
military determined that they posed absolutely no threat to national security; the Bush 
Administration had made a mistake.4  Today, months after their official exoneration, 
these two men are still in Guantanamo, entrapped in a continuous legal battle for their 
freedom, with no end in sight 
Al-Hakim and Qassim were brought to Guantanamo in the months immediately 
following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.5  They are among hundreds of 
others detained by the Bush Administration in a recent effort to crack down on terrorism.  
Both Al-Hakim and Qassim were virtually kidnapped by Pakistani bounty hunters, sold 
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2to the United States government, and sent to Guantanamo, where they could be held 
indefinitely, without any evidence of wrongdoing.6  Guantanamo detainees cannot appeal 
to international law, as they are alleged to be “enemy combatants” and to fall outside the 
jurisdictional scope of legal instruments such as the Geneva Conventions.7  In addition, 
they cannot appeal to domestic criminal laws because Guantanamo is not considered U.S. 
sovereign territory and thus detainees do not have any rights under U.S. law.  Few 
detainees have been lucky enough to go in front of Combatant Status Review Tribunals 
where they have had the meager opportunity to contest their unlawful detention.  For Al-
Hakim and Qassim, however, even an official acknowledgment of innocence has not 
secured their freedom.
  Both Al-Hakim and Qassim are Uighurs,8 a minority group whose members are 
fleeing China because of systematic persecution by the Chinese government.  
International law forbids the U.S. from sending refugees back to countries where they 
will be persecuted.  The government justifies the two men’s imprisonment by the fact that 
they cannot legally be repatriated to China.9  The Bush Administration admits that the 
situation is unfortunate, and purports that it is employing all possible means of finding a 
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3suitable third country to relocate the two Uighurs.  Among the 25 countries approached, 
however, so far none has been willing.10  Meanwhile, these men remain imprisoned.  
An alternative solution, posed by counsel to Al-Hakim and Qassim, is to grant the 
men asylum and permit them into the United States pending a more favorable solution.  
The United States government opposes an asylum claim, however, arguing that refugees 
cannot petition for asylum from outside United States jurisdiction because it is against the 
procedural regulations.11  Is it not also against the rules to imprison individuals 
indefinitely that have committed no crime?  
The government should be reminded that asylum is a discretionary function, one 
in which necessity plays a critical role in the determination.  The fact that the alternative 
is, in effect, keeping these men shackled to cement floors in Guantanamo, is a very 
persuasive factor in favor of granting asylum.  Permitting Al-Hakim and Qassim to enter 
the United States in no way compensates them for the immeasurable injustice they have 
faced, but can at least provide them a temporary reprieve from further injustice.  
Al-Hakim and Qassim represent a larger systematic problem, one that occurs 
when the government disposes of essential legal protections that are integral to a system 
of justice.  It is beyond the scope of this paper to address all of the due process concerns 
raised by conditions at Guantanamo, enemy combatant status, and other decisions under 
the War on Terrorism that curb due process rights.12  However, the story of Al- Hakim 
and Qassim is a microcosm of the larger problems caused when the U.S. government sets 
10 Id.
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4aside due process, international law, and concerns for justice and fairness in the name of 
the War on Terrorism. 
Background
On September 18, 2001, just seven days after the terrorist attacks of September 
11, 2001, Congress enacted the Authorization for Use of Military Force Joint Resolution 
[AUMF],13 which permits the United States Armed Forces to use the necessary force to 
apprehend those responsible for the violent attacks on the United States.14  This 
legislation authorizes the President to “use all necessary and appropriate force against 
those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or 
aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001  . . . in order to prevent 
any future acts of international terrorism against the United States . . . .”15
Only two months later, pursuant to the authority vested in the president by 
AUMF, President George Bush issued an executive military order regarding the 
detention, treatment, and trial of non-citizens in the War on Terrorism.16  In the order, 
President Bush declared that, due to the gravity of the situation that the United States now 
faces as a nation under attack, he must be given authority as Commander in Chief to use 
the armed forces to identify potential terrorists and eliminate their capacity for 
destruction.17  In order to do this effectively, the President stated that “the principles of 
law and the rules of evidence generally recognized in the trial of criminal cases in the 
United States district courts” could not be applied to the measures dictated in this order.18
13
 Authorization For Use of Military Force, PL 107-40, 115 Stat 224 (2001).
14 Id.
15 Id.
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 Exec. Order: Detention, Treatment and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 
Fed. Reg. 57833 (Nov. 13, 2001).
17 Id. at 57833. 
18 Id.
5In a broadly discretionary and unilateral move, President Bush defined the 
individuals subject to this order as 
[A]ny individual who is not a United States citizen with respect to whom I 
determine from time to time in writing that: (1) there is reason to believe 
that such individual, at the relevant times, (i) is or was a member of the 
organization known as Al Qaeda; (ii) has engaged in, aided or abetted, or 
conspired to commit, acts of international terrorism, or acts in preparation 
therefore, that have caused, threaten to cause, or have as their aim to 
cause, injury to or adverse effects on the United States, its citizens, 
national security, foreign policy, or economy . . . .”19
Those individuals who fall within this category may be detained at an 
“appropriate location” at the President’s discretion and will be tried, “when tried,”20 by a 
military commission which shall have exclusive jurisdiction.21  As a result of this order, 
the United States began a full-scale attack on the Taliban and Al-Qaeda forces including 
the detention of numerous people such as Al-Hakim and Qassim.22  Ironically, the 
operation was dubbed “Enduring Freedom.”23
Initially the administration intended to provide these individuals with trials by 
military commissions, by working within the framework set up by President Bush’s 
executive order.  However, once military officials realized that they did not have 
sufficient evidence to prosecute many of those detained in Guantanamo, President Bush 
changed the rules once again by reclassifying the status of the detainees.24
Denying the detainees a trial by military commission is a clear violation of 
international law under the Geneva Convention,25 thus requiring the President to redefine 
19 Id. at 57834.  
20 Id.  (Emphasis added)
21 Executive Order, Nov. 13, 2001, supra note 16, at 57835.
22 Id.
23 Shumate, supra note 7, at 1-6.  
24 Id. at 7.
25
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6the detainees as something other than Prisoners of War [POW] in order to bypass the 
laws of the Geneva Convention.26  In February of 2002, President Bush did just that.  By 
declaring that members of Al-Qaeda were no longer POWs, but Enemy Combatants, 
Bush effectively placed the detainees outside the scope of protection under the Geneva 
Convention.27  Without these protections the detainees were no longer entitled to humane 
treatment, limitations on interrogation techniques, due process, communication with 
outside agencies, or automatic release upon the conclusion of the conflict.28  Thus, “by 
executive order, military regulation, and other unilateral methods, the Bush 
Administration . . . created the status of enemy combatant to deny alleged terrorists 
essential rights under the Constitution and the Geneva Conventions . . . .”29
As a result of the lack of legal requirements applicable to detainees labeled as 
Enemy Combatants, friends and relatives began to file petitions for writs of habeas 
corpus30 on behalf of those imprisoned.31  Two of these men were actually American 
consist of four separate treatises, which establish limits and boundaries on wartime behavior between 
nation-states.  Shumate supra note 7, at 10-14   The four treatises include: (1) Convention for the 
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in the Armed Forces in the Field, (2) Convention 
for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at 
Sea, (3) Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, and (4) Convention Relative to the 
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War.  Id.  The one guideline common to all four conventions is 
Article 3, which requires that all nation states party to the conventions must abide by the guidelines 
regardless of whether the other part in conflict is party to the conventions.  Id.
26
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 28 U.S.C.A. § 2241 (1948):  “(a) Writs of habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court, any 
justice thereof, the district courts and any circuit judge within their respective jurisdictions. The order of a 
circuit judge shall be entered in the records of the district court of the district wherein the restraint 
complained of is had. (b) The Supreme Court, any justice thereof, and any circuit judge may decline to 
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7citizens.32  These cases began the United States Supreme Court’s long journey of 
“asserting a role for itself” in the War on Terrorism by defining the war powers of the 
Executive.33  Through a number of integral cases, the Court began its analysis of what it 
means to be designated an enemy combatant and what legal rights, if any, should be 
granted to the detainees presently confined in Guantanamo.  In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,34 in a 
case involving a detainee who was an American citizen, Justice O’Connor announced the 
decision of the court holding that, in this narrowly prescribed circumstance, U.S. citizens 
detained as enemy combatants deserve the opportunity to be heard before a neutral body 
in order to contest the basis for their detention.35  On the same day that Hamdi was 
decided, the Supreme Court held in Rasul that the United States federal courts have 
jurisdiction to hear cases involving the potentially indefinite detention of foreign 
nationals in Guantanamo.36
(2) He is in custody for an act done or omitted in pursuance of an Act of Congress, or an order, process, 
judgment or decree of a court or judge of the United States; or
(3) He is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States; or
(4) He, being a citizen of a foreign state and domiciled therein is in custody for an act done or omitted 
under any alleged right, title, authority, privilege, protection, or exemption claimed under the 
commission, order or sanction of any foreign state, or under color thereof, the validity and effect of 
which depend upon the law of nations; or
(5) It is necessary to bring him into court to testify or for trial.
(d) Where an application for a writ of habeas corpus is made by a person in custody under the judgment 
and sentence of a State court of a State which contains two or more Federal judicial districts, the 
application may be filed in the district court for the district wherein such person is in custody or in the 
district court for the district within which the State court was held which convicted and sentenced him and 
each of such district courts shall have concurrent jurisdiction to entertain the application. The district court 
for the district wherein such an application is filed in the exercise of its discretion and in furtherance of 
justice may transfer the application to the other district court for hearing and determination.”
31
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33 Id. at 1063.
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8United States courts, however, have not uniformly interpreted the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Rasul, and thus the full implications of the decision are yet to be 
known.  For example, on January 19, 2005, Judge Leon of the United States District 
Court for the District of Columbia, held in Khalid v. Bush that non-resident aliens 
detained in a prison outside of the jurisdiction of the United States have no constitutional 
rights.37  Judge Leon rejected what he described as the petitioner’s “expansive 
interpretation” of the Supreme Court’s decision in Rasul, insisting that the Supreme 
Court has made it clear that non-resident aliens captured and detained outside the United 
States, pursuant to executive authority, have no constitutional basis to petition for writs of 
habeas corpus.38  Leon stated that the Rasul decision was limited to answering the 
question of whether the federal courts have jurisdiction to determine the legality of the 
Executive’s potentially indefinite detentions of people who claim innocence.39  He 
asserted that the majority in Rasul failed to address whether or not the detainees actually 
possessed individual substantive constitutional rights by declining to rule on the merits of 
the petitioner’s asserted claims.40  In addition, Judge Leon rejected petitioner’s claim that 
Guantanamo is effectively US sovereign territory despite the United States’ plenary and 
exclusive control over Guantanamo.41
In contrast to Khalid v. Bush, Judge Green in In Re Guantanamo42 held that 
detainees have a fundamental right not to be deprived of liberty without due process.43
Judge Green declined to interpret Rasul so narrowly as to assert that the holding merely 
37 Khalid v. Bush, 355 F. Supp. 2d 311, 311 (D.D.C. 2005).
38 Id. at 321.
39 Id. at 323.
40 Id. 
41 Id. at 322.
42 In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp.2d 443 (D.D.C. 2005).
43 Id. at 443.
9conferred habeas jurisdiction to the federal courts without declaring that Petitioners had 
substantive rights as well.44  In addition, Judge Green acknowledged the special nature of 
Guantanamo and implied in dicta that Guantanamo, although a unique entity, should be 
considered equivalent to U.S. territory.”45  The decisions in Khalid and In re 
Guantanamo, have been consolidated on appeal and are pending in the United States 
Court of Appeals.46
On July 7, 2004, less than a week following the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Rasul, the Deputy Secretary of Defense issued an order establishing Combatant Status 
Review Tribunals (CSRT). The rights provided in the order are (1) notification, within 10 
days of the right to contest designation as an enemy combatant and to seek a writ of 
habeas corpus in United States Courts, (2) designation of a “personal representative,” (3) 
the opportunity to review all relevant, available information before contesting their 
detention in front of a tribunal, (4) and “neutral commissions officers” as the tribunal.47
If the tribunal determines that the detainee is no longer a threat to the United States and 
should be not classified enemy combatant, the Secretary of Defense will then coordinate 
the release of the detainee.48  Later court cases, such as Khalid v. Bush, seem to dilute the 
potency of Bush’s executive order by concluding that enemy combatants who are not 
American citizens “lack any viable theory under the United States Constitution to 
challenge the lawfulness of their continued detention.” 49  However, because the decision 
44 Id. at 454.
45 Id. at 463.
46 Qassim v. Bush, 382 F.Supp.2d 126, 128 (D.D.C. 2005)
47
 Memorandum from Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz to the Secretary of the Navy (July 7, 
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49 Khalid v. Bush, 355 F. Supp. 2d 311, 323 (D.D.C. 2005).
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is currently pending appeal, it is difficult to speculate about the actual repercussions of 
decisions such as Khalid.50
Even assuming these tribunals truly pass constitutional muster, for example, that 
the “neutral” decision makers will be truly unbiased,51 what will happen to those such as 
Al-Hakim and Qassim, whose status of enemy combatant has been revoked and who 
cannot return to their home country, is of immediate concern.  Qassim and Al-Hakim are 
Uighurs, a group of people whose members are being systematically oppressed and 
persecuted by the Chinese government.52  This comment addresses specifically the issue 
of what happens to the innocent, when the U.S. government divorces concepts such as 
due process and fairness from the anti-terrorism dialogue.  
Al-Hakim and Qassim are not the only Uighur detainees who are faced with this 
predicament and we have no way of knowing how many more alleged terrorists will be 
determined to be innocent.  The Bush Administration requires that the Secretary of 
Defense coordinate the release of detainees who no longer, or never did, pose a risk to the 
United States, yet Al-Hakim and Qassim have not yet been released.  There are no 
guidelines or rules in this new War on Terrorism concerning detainees who have been 
declassified as enemy combatants and who are unable to return to their native countries.  
Thus for the moment, Qassim and Al-Hakim remain in a devastating and frustrating legal 
limbo.  
50 Qassim, 382 F.Supp.2d at 128.
51
 Yin, supra note 31, at 1101.  See also In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp.2d 443, 468-475 
(D.D.C. 2005) (discussing the grave potential for bias in the CSRT determination process).  
52
 Amnesty International, People’s Republic of China Uighurs fleeing persecution as China wages it “war 
on terror” 2 (July 7, 2004), http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/engasa170212004. 
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Uighur Background
The Uighurs are Turkic speaking Chinese Muslims who have made their home in 
East Turkistan, also known as the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region of China, for 
over 4000 years.53  East Turkistan lies in the heart of Asia, with Kazakstan, Kyrgzstan, 
Afganistan, and Tajikistan to the West; Pakistan and India to the Southwest; Tibet to the 
South; Russia and Mongolia to the North; and China to the East.54   The Uighurs 
comprise the majority of the Muslim population in East Turkistan, consisting of 
approximately 8.68 million in numbers.55  Uighurs are considered indigenous peoples of 
East Turkistan, with a history rich in culture, religion and tradition.56  Although the 
Uighur people have subscribed to numerous religious traditions in the last 4,000 years, 
including Shamanism, Buddhism and Christianity, they ultimately embraced the theology 
of Islam.57
While East Turkistan historically lay outside the boundaries of China, in 1911 
Chinese Nationalists overthrew the Machu Empire,58 which had annexed East Turkistan 
in 1876, and the Uighur people came under Chinese control.59  The Uighurs have staged 
numerous uprisings and revolts against China and claimed their independence twice, once 
in 1933 and again in 1944.  The relationship between the Chinese government and the 
Uighur people has remained tenuous, with the Uighur people continually attempting to 
53
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exert their autonomy and political freedom.60  As a result of this continuous power 
struggle, extreme political and religious repression has become common practice by the 
Chinese government, and the Uighur people have been exposed to severe human rights 
abuses and violations.61  The Chinese government has justified this use of violence by 
classifying the Uighur people as “religious extremist forces” and “violent terrorists.”62
According to the U.S. Department of State, the Chinese government has 
historically had a poor record with regards to human rights violations, and tolerance for 
religious and political freedom is substantially deteriorating.63  The U.S. Bureau of 
Democracy, Human Rights and Labor has noted abuses by the Chinese government 
including “extrajudicial killings; torture and mistreatment of prisoners, leading to 
numerous deaths in custody; coerced confessions; arbitrary arrest and detention; and 
incommunicado detention.”64  Those Uighurs who have been classified as political 
separatists have been exposed to abbreviated trials and executions that often occur 
immediately preceding convictions or denials of appeals.65  Credible Uighur detainees 
who have been released have told of torture methods employed by Chinese officials, such 
as shock therapy, solitary confinement, beatings, and numerous other forms of abuse.66
The Chinese government has also instituted a religious regulation measure that requires 
all religious groups to register with the State Administration for Religious Affairs. 
60 Id. 
61 Id.  (“Reports from Xinjiang document a pattern of abuse, including political imprisonment, torture, and 
disappearance. Mosques are summarily closed and the Uyghur language is banned from use in universities. 
Uyghurs are subjected to compulsory unpaid labor in the construction of a pipeline planned to export local 
petroleum resources to other parts of China. Uyghurs also continue to be the only population in China 
consistently subjected to executions for political crimes, and these executions are often both summary and 
public.”)
62 Id.  
63
 U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices on China 2004, (Feb. 28 2005) 
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/41640.htm.  
64 Id. 
65 Id.
66 Id.
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Muslim Uighurs who have failed to register are experiencing official interference, 
repression and harassment.67
Since September 11, 2001, the Chinese government has been cracking down even 
harder on ethnic minority groups such as the Uighurs, using the terrorist attacks as a 
pretext for harsher penalties and decreasing tolerance of Uighur separatists, many of 
whom have been promoting peaceful expressions of dissent.68  Although the government 
has consolidated these efforts under the guise of a campaign to stabilize Xinjiang by 
cracking down on the “three evils of extremism, splittism, and terrorism,” it is unclear 
whether these measures are targeting violent Uighur separatists or peaceful dissenters.69
For example, the government has created a list of “terrorist organizations” and among 
which are the World Uighur Youth Congress and the East Turkestan Information Center.  
Although both organizations are advocates of independence, neither has been linked with 
promoting violent means to achieve this goal.70  Even workers whose jobs are primarily 
categorized as promoting Uighur cultural awareness and identity have been harassed and 
detained by the government.71
While the United States government acknowledges that certain Uighur political 
separatists may pose a violent threat to the People’s Republic of China as well as to the 
United States,72 the administration also recognizes the massive human rights violations 
67 Id. 
68 Id. 
69
 U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices on China 2004, (Feb. 28 2005) 
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/41640.htm.  
70 Id. 
71 Id. 
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 CRS Report for Congress RS21995, U.S.-China Counter-Terrorism Cooperation: Issues for U.S. Policy, 
by Shirley Kan (May 12, 2005) http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS21995.pdf.  
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imposed on Uighur separatists who are not violent protesters.73  Although it is clear that 
the Uighur people have actively opposed Chinese rule throughout history, the Uighur 
resistance movements have received very little international support and attention until 
recently.74
After September 11, the United States employed the help of the Chinese 
government to collaborate in the fight against terrorism and thus sparked an international 
interest in alleged links between Uighur groups and radical Islamic groups in Central 
Asia.75  Of particular interest have been allegedly violent political groups such as the 
Organization for the Liberation of Uighurstan, Wolves of Lop Nor, and Home of East 
Turkistan Youth.76  Despite affiliations between the aforementioned groups and the 
Uighur autonomous movement, the United States acknowledges that there are many 
Uighur groups who advocate independence through peaceful measures.77
As a result of the new global collaboration against terrorism, researchers for the 
Congressional Research Service claim that it has become difficult for the United States to 
“balance its needs to create a broad-based multi-state coalition to fight against terrorism 
with traditional American obligations to protect and defend religious freedoms and 
human rights.”78  In October, 2001, President Bush definitively stated that the United 
States did not support China’s policies against many ethnic minorities such as the 
Uighurs and that the War on Terrorism should not be used as a pretext for cracking down 
73
 U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices on China 2004, (Feb. 28 2005) 
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/41640.htm.  
74 Id.   
75
 CRS Report for Congress RS31213, China’s Relations with central Asian States and Problem’s with 
Terrorism 7 (Dec. 17, 2001) http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/7945.pdf. 
76 Id. at 8-9.
77 Id. at 12.
78 Id. at 3.
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on political separatists.79  However, international reports show that thousands of Uighur 
activists have been detained using the War on Terrorism as justification and the United 
States has muted its former criticism of human rights violations by the Chinese 
government.80
The conflict posed by the desire to end terrorism while at the same time promote 
human rights is crystallized by the situation of the Uighur prisoners currently detained in 
Guantanamo, who remain in legal limbo.  The Uighur men in Guantanamo were initially 
detained in the effort to thwart terrorism.  Now that the government no longer classifies 
them as enemy combatants, they should be returned to their home country.  However, if 
the U.S. government was to return these men to a country where they will be inevitably 
imprisoned and persecuted, the return itself would be in violation of international human 
rights laws.  As a result, they remain imprisoned in Guantanamo.    
Abu Bakker Qassim and A’del Abdu Al-Hakim
Mr. Abu Bakker Qassim, age 36 and Mr. A’del Abdu Al-Hakim, age 31, are both 
Turskistani Uighurs (natives of East Turkistan), and are currently being detained at 
Guantanamo Bay.81  Both men have been found by the United States government to pose 
no risk to the United States; however, the Bush administration cannot send them back to 
China for fear that they will be imprisoned or killed by the Chinese government.82
Very little information concerning these men is available to the public.83  Qassim 
is married and has three children, two of whom are twins whom he has never seen or 
79 Id. at 7.
80
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spoken with.84  Al-Hakim is also married with three children, one of whom he has never 
seen.85  Both men were attempting to flee persecution of the Chinese government when 
they were seized by Pakistani Security Forces in late 2001 or early 2002 and turned over 
to United States Security Forces.  They were then held in Afghanistan and ultimately 
brought to Guantanamo in June of 2002.86  According to their lawyers, neither man 
harbored any negative feelings towards the United States, although they staunchly 
opposed the actions of the Chinese Government and are believed to have received some 
weapons training in Afghanistan under the Taliban.87
Although the exact date is unknown, sometime around late 2004 or early 2005, 
both Qassim and Al-Hakim appeared before a Combatant Status Review Tribunal 
(CSRT) and were found to be No Longer Enemy Combatants (NLEC).  Currently fifteen 
Chinese Muslims (Uighurs) are still detained at Guantanamo Bay.  Five of the men were 
found to be “in the wrong place at the wrong time” while ten were later determined to be 
low-risk detainees.88
On March 10, 2005, Qassim and Al-Hakim (hereinafter Petitioners) jointly 
petitioned for writs of habeas corpus from Guantanamo Bay military detention facility.89
They were represented by Sabin Willett and Susan Baker Manning from Bingham 
McCutchen LLP and Barbara Olshansky from the Center for Constitutional Rights.90  In 
the petition, the Petitioners alleged that they were being detained unlawfully, without 
84
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charge, without access to counsel, and in violation of their due process rights.91  The writ 
also requested that the government release them pending the establishment of a 
legitimate, lawful basis for detention.92  The Respondents in the case are President 
George W. Bush, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Commander of Joint Task 
Force GTMO Brigadier Gen. Jay Hood, and Commander of Joint Detention Operations 
Group and the JTF-GTMO detention camps Col. Bricc Gyursko.  Counsel for 
Respondents include Terry M. Henry, Robert J. Katerberg, Joseph Hunt and Vincent 
Garvey from the United States Dept. of Justice.93  At the time the writ was filed, neither 
Petitioners’ counsel, nor Judge Robertson of the United States District Court for the 
District of Columbia, were aware that Petitioners had already gone before a CSRT and 
found to be NLEC.94
In response to the suit, the Government immediately moved for a stay of 
proceedings pending the Court of Appeals decision in the consolidated appeals of Khalid 
91
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v. Bush95 and In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases.96  At this point in the proceedings the 
Government was aware that the Petitioners had been officially determined to be NLECs, 
but did not inform Petitioners’ counsel or the judge of this determination.97 Ignorant of 
the Petitioners’ changed status, on April 13, 2005, Judge Robertson granted the stay of 
proceedings.98  It was not until mid-July that counsel learned of their clients’ status.  
When they ultimately became aware that their clients had been determined innocent, they 
immediately filed an emergency order to vacate the stay order,99 asserting that, given 
CSRT findings of innocence, the Petitioners should be released immediately.100
In the emergency order, Petitioners’ counsel argued that, at the time Petitioners 
filed the writ for habeas corpus, counsel had no communications with the men and thus 
had no way of knowing their status.101  Although press reports in March of 2005 alleged 
that “the Pentagon determined last year that half of the two dozen Uighur Chinese 
captured in the War on Terrorism have no intelligence value and should be released,”102
at no point did the government inform Petitioners’ counsel of the CSRT results.  During 
this time, to no avail, the Petitioners’ counsel on two separate occasions sought 
information from the government concerning their clients’ status.103  The government did 
not respond to these requests and it was not until mid-July, during counsel’s first face-to-
face interview with their clients that they discovered that Petitioners had been found 
NLEC, information that they confirmed with a JAG officer at Guantanamo Bay on July 
95
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14, 2005.104  Counsel later learned that it was sometime in late 2004 or early 2005, that 
the Petitioners had received written statements with the results of the CRST decisions.  
Although both Petitioners wrote their counsel to inform them of the results, counsel never 
received this notification.105
Petitioners’ counsel contended that not only did the government ignore their 
requests for information, but actually implied the opposite – that Qassim and Al-Hakim 
had been found to be Enemy Combatants.106  In the emergency motion to vacate the stay, 
Petitioners’ counsel provided an example of the government’s misleading conduct.  On 
March, 29, 2005 in an official government filing, the government noted that “[a] factual 
record for a petitioner in a Guantanamo Bay detainee case typically has consisted of the 
record of proceedings for the Combatant Status Review Tribunal that confirmed 
petitioner’s status as an enemy combatant properly subject to detention.”107  Counsel
contended that this was misleading, given the government’s knowledge of Petitioners’ 
status.108
In the emergency motion to vacate the stay, Petitioners contended that, while it is 
unclear whether the CSRT process is actually lawful to begin with,109 even under the 
current system “it must follow that when the executive branch determines a person not to 
be an enemy combatant, no extrajudicial basis remains to justify imprisonment.”110   In 
104
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the cases of Qassim and Al-Hakim there is no dispute that the Petitioners are not and 
were never Enemy Combatants.111
Counsel also argued that public policy requires that the government not illegally 
detain people found to be wholly innocent.112  “The public has a strong interest in 
ensuring that its laws do not subject individuals to indefinite detention without due 
process; ‘[i]t is always in the public interest to prevent the violation of a party’s 
constitutional rights.”113
While Petitioners’ counsel acknowledged that there are practical problems with 
the case at hand, such as finding a suitable country to accept the two Petitioners, they 
strongly asserted, “being a refugee is not a crime justifying indefinite detention.”114
Whether or not another country will be ultimately willing to accept them, the United 
States must find a suitable alternative to maximum-security prison.115
The Government opposed the Petitioners’ emergency motion to vacate the stay 
and a hearing was set before Judge Robertson for August 1, 2005.116  At the hearing P. 
Sabin Willet, Esquire, counsel for the Petitioners, recapped much of his argument in the 
emergency motion.  In addition, he conceded that if Respondents were not willing to 
111 Id. at 8.  See also Memorandum from Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz to the Secretary of 
the Navy (July 7, 2004) (ordering that “Non Enemy Combatant Determination: If the tribunal determines 
that the detainee shall no longer be classified as an enemy combatant, the written report of its decision shall 
be forwarded directly to the Secretary of Defense or his designee.  The Secretary or his designee shall so 
advise the Secretary of State, in order to permit the Secretary of State to coordinate the transfer of the 
detainees for release to the detainee’s country of citizenship or other disposition consistent with domestic 
and international obligations and the foreign policy of the United States.”)
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immediately release Petitioners, there might be other viable solutions. 117  For example, 
the Petitioners could be accommodated in the civilian area of the Guantanamo Base.118
Counsel argued that this has happened before in Guantanamo in the 1990s in the case of 
Haitian refugees who had been intercepted on the high seas.  Like the Petitioners, these 
men had committed no crime and consequently were sent to the Marine barracks at 
Guantanamo pending their asylum requests.119  Another suggested alternative was 
requiring the physical presence of the Petitioners in the United States.  Counsel argued 
that it is within a habeas judge’s power to require that a person in a habeas case be 
brought physically to the courtroom.120  If this were to happen while the case was 
pending, the Petitioners could be released, under supervisory conditions, into the Uighur 
community in the United States.121
Regardless of the government’s practical dilemmas, counsel for the Petitioners 
strongly emphasized the unethical nature of continued detention.122  These men, he 
stated, “they are not soldiers, they’re not criminals, they’re just Uighur people . . . they 
are husbands, they are fathers, they are sons.”123  While counsel acknowledged that there 
had been positive changes in the conditions of the Petitioners’ confinement, Willet 
reminded the court that his clients were still chained to the ground when he went to meet 
with them.124  As he stated to the judge, during his first interview with his clients Willet 
observed, “a slight, gentle man with a shy smile chained to the floor, a man sitting in a 
117
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box that had no windows.”125  In addition, Willet informed the Judge that Al-Hakim had 
spoken by telephone with his sister, Kabsur Abdul Hakim, a Uighur refugee living in 
Sweden who had thought her brother to be dead.126  “And she was right” argued Willet 
before the judge, “these people are dead to the outside world.  They’re dead to their 
children, they’re dead to their wives, even their names are a secret.”127  The delay in 
release in this case is the harm itself, and “every single day this continues is another small 
death.”128
The government, represented by Terry M. Henry, responded that both requests, 
the lifting of the stay order and altered living conditions while in custody, should be 
dismissed.129  In response to Petitioners’ allegations that there is no legal premise to 
continually detain these men, he argued that the “executive’s authority to make war 
includes the power to detain individuals as enemy combatants.”130  This power extends 
authority to the executive to “wind up that detention in an orderly fashion.”131  Henry 
found support for this authority through historical precedent such as the end of World 
War II, the Korean War, and the Gulf War.132   He gave the example that after World 
War II there were numerous individuals detained who could not be repatriated for fear of 
persecution.133  Henry analogized the situation despite the crucial distinguishing factor 
that, unlike AL-Hakim and Qassim, detainees during World War II were POWs.134
125 Id. at 10.
126 Id. at 12.
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This “wind up power” would include finding a suitable country in which to 
transfer the Petitioners.  This is a long, ongoing process, and given that Petitioners cannot 
be returned to China, Henry contended that their continued detention is justified in the 
interim.135  In addition, in response to the allegations that the living conditions of the 
Petitioners are unsuitable and that the courts should intervene, Henry argued that the 
court’s constitutional authority to intervene with the executive’s power to detain terrorists 
is currently on appeal in the D.C. Circuit and thus had no place to be deliberated in the 
case at hand.136  Although acknowledging that the right to file a writ for habeas corpus 
was decided by the Supreme Court in Rasul, Henry stated that there was no indication of 
whether detainees actually possess any substantive rights once a writ is filed.137
Regardless, Henry asserted that it would be impossible to move Petitioners to a 
less restricted living area.  He explained that the situation with Haitian refugees, that 
Petitioners’ counsel had alluded to, was distinguishable.  Unlike the Uighurs, the Haitians 
had been interdicted on the high seas had never been accused of any crime; were housed 
at Migrant Operations Center; had been through numerous background checks; and were 
awaiting pending asylum decisions or third party countries to accept them.138  Some of 
these men were permitted to seek work at retail establishments at Guantanamo.  The 
judge quickly reminded Henry that, although Petitioners were initially alleged to be 
enemy combatants, they were found to be NLEC and completely exonerated.  Ultimately, 
135
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however, the judge agreed that moving Petitioners to civilian headquarters at 
Guantanamo would not be a suitable alternative due to logistical obstacles.139
The government also responded to counsel’s complaints that they were not 
informed of their clients’ status as NLEC in a timely fashion.  As Henry stated, 
“basically, we have 120 cases on behalf of more then 230 detainees.  We receive requests 
as to informal discovery as to the status, all the kinds of aspects with respect to 
Petitioners, and we generally do not respond to those simply because we are not in the 
position to do it . . . .”140  Mr. Henry, however, did not explain why the government was 
not in the position to respond to these requests.  Judge Robertson, not satisfied with this 
response, elicited further justifications for this withholding of information to which 
Henry stated that generally the government does not inform counsel of intent to release 
detainees unless they are ready for immediate release.141
At this point in the hearing, counsel for the Petitioners was given the opportunity 
to rebut some of the statements by government’s counsel.  Willet’s response to the 
concept of a “wind up power” was two-fold.  First, he contended that there is no legal 
basis for this wind up theory, and that in Zadvydas, Justice Breyer for the Supreme Court 
found that six months is the longest you may detain an individual simply because they 
cannot be repatriated.142  Additionally, Willet argued that it remained unclear whether 
efforts to find Petitioners a third country to take them in had been instigated and were 
actually underway.  Lastly, Willet made two requests.  The first request was that 
telephone communications be permitted between Petitioners and their counsel and 
139 Id. at 31.
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Petitioners and their families.  The second request was that an exception be made to the 
requirement that translators brought into Guantanamo be U.S. citizens and that Willet be 
permitted to provide his own interpreter.143  Henry immediately rejected both of these 
requests.  As a result, Judge Robertson requested both parties to submit supplemental 
briefs on those specific issues within five days, so that he could review them before the 
case came to court.144
   On August 19, 2005 the parties convened in the United States District Court for 
the District of Columbia to hear Judge Robertson’s decision regarding the 
aforementioned issues.145  In reference to the “wind up power,” mentioned by 
government’s counsel in the August 1 hearing, Judge Robertson declared that although it 
seemed to lack legal justification, the legality was irrelevant, given the desire by both 
parties for the release of the Petitioners.146  The disagreement at issue concerned when 
the Petitioners would be released, where they would be placed, and what authority the 
courts had to adjudicate the issue.  
The Judge began his analysis by agreeing with Petitioner’s assertion that the stay 
should be lifted because the cases on appeal concern detainees that have been found to be 
Enemy Combatants.  For practical purposes, however, he acknowledged that an order 
requiring immediate release of the Petitioners would be immediately appealed and the 
Court of Appeals would issue a stay.147  In reference to Petitioners’ contention that the 
court should order the Petitioners to be brought to court in the United States, Judge 
Robertson stated that the issue is no longer pertinent.  When Petitioners introduced the 
143 Id. at 37.
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idea at the August 1st hearing, they argued that bringing the Petitioners to the United 
States was a way to address the lack of telephonic communication, inadequate translators, 
and unfair conditions imposed upon the meetings between counsel and their clients.148
The supplemental briefs submitted by government’s counsel made large concessions on 
these points and thus Judge Robertson did not find it necessary to rule on the request.149
Judge Robertson, however, alluded to the fact that the government’s legal argument 
against the court’s right to produce the body of a habeas petitioner circumvents the actual 
situation.150   In response to the proposition that the Petitioners be moved to civilian 
headquarters at Guantanamo, Judge Robertson reiterated his position at the hearing that 
this was not practical.151  Lastly, despite the obvious sympathy Judge Robertson had for 
Petitioners, he did not see ordering their release as a viable option.  Instead he ordered
another hearing, set for August 25, 2005, to discuss the Petitioners’ living conditions in 
the interim.152
At the August 25 hearing, very little transpired.  Again, Willet argued for the 
Petitioners that their indefinite detention was unjust and that while the living conditions 
had improved incrementally, they were still in prison, and thus that the changes were not 
adequate.153 In addition, Willet argued that the relocation of his clients had apparently 
been in the works for over two years and that twenty-four countries have already declined 
the United States’ request to house the Uighur refugees.154  Willet acknowledged that, 
148 Id. at 129.
149 Id.
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while efforts were being made to relocate the Uighur Petitioners, nothing had worked yet.  
He went on to criticize the government’s inaction, saying the effort is not “going to work 
next month, it’s not going to work in six months, it’s particularly not going to work if we 
just fluff up the pillows a little bit in Gitmo and leave them there.”155
Ignoring Willet’s larger questions about an ultimate resolution to the problem, the 
Government responded by saying simply that the conditions had improved.  The 
Petitioners had been granted the interpreter preferred by Willet, Al-Hakim had 
communicated with his family, and both men had been moved to a different camp at 
Guantanamo where the living conditions were improved and they could live communally 
with other NLECs.156  While acknowledging that the phones calls were still restricted, 
Henry claimed that there is little that can be done about this.157
Since the August 25, 2005, very little has changed for Al-Hakim and Qassim.  
During the August 19 hearing, Judge Robertson refused to adjudicate on Petitioners’ 
motion to vacate the stay.158  Robertson contended that since both parties desired the 
release of Al-Hakim and Qassim, and diplomatic efforts were underway to secure a third 
country host for the two men, deciding whether or not the government has legitimate 
“wind up power” was irrelevant.159  Although the Government asserted at a hearing on 
Dec. 12, 2005 that progress was being made, it refused to elaborate on this progress for 
the court record.160
155 Id. at 20.
156 Id. at 11.
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Lack of progress, coupled with the fear that Congress may be in the process of 
enacting legislation that would strip federal courts of habeas jurisdiction convinced Judge 
Robertson that it was time to make a decision.161  Judge Robertson stated that he would 
“rule in two weeks” on the questions of: (1) whether the government has the wind-up 
authority to indefinitely detain non-U.S. citizens in Guantanamo who have been found 
NLEC and (2) if not, whether a district court has the authority to provide relief.162  At a 
hearing on Dec. 22, 2005, Judge Robertson found that while indefinite imprisonment at 
Guantanamo is unlawful,163 the separation of powers doctrine forbids a district judge 
from providing relief to the Petitioners.164  The only viable relief would entail releasing 
Al-Hakim and Qassim.  Judge Robertson held that the political ramifications and 
potential effects on national security of such relief are “beyond the competence of the 
courts.”165
Effectively Al-Hakim’s and Qassim’s legal battle has come to an abrupt halt.  The 
case lacks closure and both men continue to be held in Guantanamo indefinitely despite 
any indication of wrongdoing.  Unfortunately, the situation that Al-Hakim and Qassim 
now face is indicative of what transpires when the rules of law and equity are divorced 
from criminal justice.  Their case is a powerful example of systematic problems in the 
handling of political detainees.  Had these two men had access to a hearing to determine 
their status upon arrival, perhaps they would not still be imprisoned in Guantanamo.  
Regardless, ignoring the principles behind international humanitarian law and domestic 
161 Id. at 2.  The defense authorization bill, which was approved by Congress the week of Dec. 24, 2005, 
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criminal laws, the Bush Administration has thrown these two men into a legal black hole.  
Thus far, the Government has been either unable or unwilling to find a solution.  
Principles Behind International Humanitarian and Domestic Criminal Laws
Al-Hakim and Qassim are not alone at Guantanamo.  How many people are being 
held in Guantanamo right now?  In the words of Erwin Chemerinsky, “unless you have 
classified information, you do not know.”166  The reality is that nobody outside really 
knows what is going on inside Guantanamo Bay Naval Base.  Currently there are 
estimated to be between 500 and 600 individuals detained, most of whom have no access 
to lawyers, friends or family and no means by which to contest their detention.167  In 
other words, there are no methods in place to protect these individuals’ liberty or freedom 
despite the fact that these are concepts that are supposedly so integral to our national 
identity.  
While those detained in Guantanamo might not fit our traditional ideas of the 
common criminal, and while the threat of terrorism may not mold to our traditional 
concept of war, it does not naturally follow that we should disregard our traditional 
notions of fairness and freedom.  International and domestic laws regarding the treatment 
of alleged wrongdoers have evolved to protect these very notions and should be a crucial 
part of the discussion regarding the rights of the detainees in Guantanamo.  Historically, 
it has been the United States that has shaped the very policies that we seem to be 
flagrantly ignoring today.    
Humanitarian international law and domestic criminal laws together create a 
system of checks and balances designed to curb the “unbridled power” of states to detain 
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people indefinitely without just cause.168  The important principles governing the advent 
of such laws are without question.  They involve protecting an individual’s right to 
freedom, personal liberty, reputation, and quality of life, all of which are rights that we, 
as a society, have a considerable interest in protecting.169  International agreements, such 
as the Geneva Conventions, and domestic human and civil rights laws grounded in the 
constitution protect these interests, interests that are being unduly compromised in the 
treatment of prisoners in Guantanamo Bay.  
The treatment of prisoners such as Al-Hakim and Qassim is indicative of this 
larger, systemic problem.  Al-Hakim and Qassim have felt the consequences of what 
transpires when we ignore concepts such as due process in favor of considerations like 
logistical issue and convenience.  Ironically Al-Hakim and Qassim, who were both 
deemed innocent by the government, are exactly those whom the laws aim to protect.  
The United States should release these two men immediately.  If no other country will 
take them, the United States should grant them asylum and permit them to enter into the 
country, regardless of procedural barriers. 
The Anomaly of Guantanamo
Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, home to Al-Hakim and Qassim for the last three to 
four years, is 45 square miles, and entirely self-sufficient.  The base has its own water 
system, school system, transportation system, and other amenities equivalent to that of a 
small city.170  The population on Guantanamo is approximately 6,000 and growing, and 
chain restaurants, such as McDonalds, Pizza Hut, Subway and KFC, have sprung up in 
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various locations.171  Guantanamo was initially acquired through an agreement with Cuba 
in 1903, in which Cuba agreed to lease the territory to the United States for 2,000 gold 
coins.172  Currently, the annual cost of the lease is $4,085.173
Guantanamo is considered a non-sovereign U.S. territory, which means that 
although the U.S. exercises “complete jurisdiction and control over and within said 
areas,” our government also recognizes Cuba’s ultimate sovereignty over the territory.174
Both Cuba and the US recognize that the lease is indefinite in nature and can only be 
terminated by mutual consent or abandonment.175
Guantanamo has historically been used as a naval base, and only in January of 
2002, did Guantanamo began to serve in its current capacity as a military detention center 
in the War on Terrorism.176  In the last three years, Guantanamo has become the home to 
approximately 660 “enemy combatants,” many of who are alleged to be Taliban and Al-
Qaeda fighters who were captured in Afghanistan after September 11, 2001.177  There are 
over 38 different nationalities represented among the Guantanamo detainees.178  Since 
January of 2002, the government’s actions with regard to Guantanamo Bay have been 
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clouded in secrecy.179  Most people in the United States do not know or understand the 
purpose of the Guantanamo Naval Base, let alone who is being detained there, what 
rights the detainees may be entitled to, and what military techniques are being 
employed.180  Recent reports insinuate that many of those currently detained in 
Guantanamo, like Al-Hakim and Qassim, may not actually be “enemy combatants” and 
may not have been captured on the battlefields in Afghanistan.181  In fact, some of the 
detainees may be actually innocent civilians with little or no ties to terrorist groups.182
Regardless, Guantanamo Bay has become a very convenient place for the United 
States to house detainees during the alleged War on Terrorism as there seems to be a 
complete absence of legal constraints on government action inside the base.183  By and 
large, Guantanamo Bay has become a virtual “rights-free zone” or “legal black hole.”184
Although this may not be entirely accurate, Guantanamo Bay does seem to fall 
conveniently outside the scope of both international and domestic law.
Guantanamo detainees lack the ordinary rights of POWs.  Generally, detainees 
captured in a time of war are entitled to certain protections, whether in accordance with 
international human rights laws or with domestic criminal law.185  The Bush 
administration, however, has declined to apply these protections to persons detained in 
the War on Terrorism, arguing that it is a new kind of war, one that justifies a different 
set of rules and regulations.186  International humanitarian rules regarding appropriate 
conduct in war have been generally codified in treaties, primarily in the four 1949 
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Geneva Conventions and the two 1977 Additional Protocols.187  These international 
agreements are specifically relevant to Guantanamo detainees, or at least they ought to 
be.  The Geneva Conventions and the Protocols have specifically established guidelines 
for the treatment of combatants and victims of war.188  Article 2, common to all of the 
Geneva Conventions, states that the guidelines are applicable to “all cases of declared 
war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High 
Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them.”189  The 
war on terror would seem to fall within the purview of armed conflict.  Even if one of the 
parties of the armed conflict is not a party to the Geneva Conventions, Article 3, also 
common to all of the Geneva Conventions, suggest that the contracting parties abide by 
the Geneva rules.190
The Geneva Conventions have established various guidelines for international 
armed conflicts by creating two categories of “protected persons”: combatants - which 
may be further defined as lawful or unlawful - and civilians.191  Lawful Combatants are 
generally defined as “members of the armed forces of a party to the international armed 
conflict.”192  This can include both members of regular armed forces as well as members 
of militias or other volunteer corps so long as they fulfill specific criteria.193  This latter 
group of individuals may openly participate in the conflict and may not be punished for 
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it, yet they can also be attacked.194  When combatants fall into the hands of an enemy, so 
long as they have complied up to that point with the laws of war, they become POWs.195
POWs are generally afforded the highest level of protections under the Geneva 
Conventions.196  Once POW status has been determined, detainees are entitled to combat 
immunity, which means they may not be punished for participating in the conflict and 
they have the right to humane treatment.197  POWs, however, may be detained for the 
duration of the conflict so as to prevent them from returning to fight alongside the 
enemy.198
Generally, those who are not classified as POWs are deemed civilians and are 
protected under the Civilian Convention, part of Geneva Convention.199  Civilians are 
defined as protected persons who “at a given moment and in any manner whatsoever, 
find themselves, in case of a conflict or occupation, in the hands of a Party to the conflict 
or Occupying Power of which they are not national.”200  Civilians may not participate in 
the hostilities and may only be detained for  “(1) punishment of criminal offenses under 
domestic legislation and (2) urgent security reasons.”201  Under the Fourth Geneva 
Convention, civilians are entitled to a regular trial with representation by counsel who 
may frequently visit the accused.202  Treatment of civilian detainees must follow very 
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strict and detailed provisions of the Fourth Convention and the cases must be reviewed 
every six months.203
Detainees who are currently housed at Guantanamo Bay, like Al-Hakim and 
Qassim, are not classified as either Legal Combatants or Civilians.  Instead, they fall 
under the new designation of Enemy or Unlawful Combatants.204  Unlawful combatants 
are generally thought of as guerrilla fighters, partisans, and members of resistance 
movements, and historically have been entitled to at least some protections under the 
Geneva Conventions.205  The Bush administration, however, denies that those captured in 
the War on Terrorism should receive protection under any of the four Geneva 
Conventions.206  The administration argues that this is a new kind of war and requires 
new rules.207  They argue that the framers of the original Geneva Conventions could not 
have envisioned this type of conflict, and thus the rules of the convention cannot and 
should not be presumed to apply to the current War on Terrorism.208  In addition, they 
claim that the detainees are not part of any state and thus are not even privy to the 
Conventions.209  Lastly, they argue that members of Al-Qaeda and the Taliban 
specifically are not entitled to POW status.210
Article 5 of the Geneva Conventions requires all detainees to be considered 
POWs by default, and that if there is any doubt as to their status, a competent tribunal 
must make the determination as to their status.211  The Bush Administration has bypassed 
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this requirement and made its own determinations, concluding that those detained at 
Guantanamo are enemy combatants, not deserving of POW status.212  Al- Hakim and 
Qassim fell within this category by default, and it was not until years after their initial 
capture that a combatant status review tribunal found them to be innocent of any charges.  
Many legal scholars argue that regardless of this classification scheme, all 
detainees captured during wartime should be entitled to rights under the Fourth Geneva 
Convention,213 such as individualized determinations of the circumstances specific to 
their detention.214  It is exactly this review that allowed Al-Hakim and Qassim to show 
that they were not involved in Al Qaeda and in the Afghanistan war.  
For some it may seem a bit unorthodox to argue that “lawful combatants,” those 
who when captured become POWs because they have followed the laws of war, can be 
detained indefinitely without access to judicial determinations, while “unlawful or enemy 
combatants” should be entitled to individualized determinations.  These requirements, 
however, are in place to ensure that mistakes are not made and that innocent people like 
Qassim and Al-Hakim, are not imprisoned.  Lawful Combatants, for example, are easy to 
distinguish; they will often concede their participation in the conflict and they often are 
found wearing uniforms, etc.215  Thus, the likelihood of erroneously detaining innocent 
people as lawful combatants is small.216  In contrast, the chance of erroneous detentions 
of unlawful or enemy combatants is much higher because it is difficult to determine their 
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status.  To date, nobody actually knows for certain how many innocent people, such as 
Al-Hakim and Qassim, are being unlawfully detained because there is very little 
information made available to the public.217  By creating a category of combatants, 
outside the scope of any detention guidelines, the Bush administration has been able to 
detain virtually anyone, for an indefinite time, without providing the person with a venue 
for contestation.218
Given the reluctance of the Bush administration to apply international rules of law 
to the War on Terrorism, advocates for those currently detained in Guantanamo have 
alternatively proposed that detainees be given access to United States courts to contest 
their detention.  Such access would ensure that the right to be free from unlawful 
detention would not be eroded without due process.  Ultimately, this right is only 
meaningful if an individual has access to United States court, or in other words, the right 
to petition for writs of habeas corpus.219  In reference to the right to habeas relief, Sabin 
Willet, counsel for Al-Hakim and Qassim stated, “Only habeas got Adel [, another 
Uighur detainee,] a chance to tell a federal judge what had happened.  Only habeas 
corpus revealed that it wasn’t just Adel who was innocent – it was Abu Bakker and 
Ahmet and Ayoub and Zakerjain and Sadiq – all Guantanamo “terrorist” whom the 
military has found innocent.”220
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Whether or not detainees held in Guantanamo have the right to seek a writ of 
habeas corpus has been a question of intense debate in the Supreme Court.221  The 
determining factor, as decided by the Supreme Court in Johnson v. Eisentrager,222 has 
been whether or not Guantanamo is considered a sovereign territory of the United States.  
As a result, the United States courts, have repeatedly denied detainees in Guantanamo the 
right to petition for writs of habeas.223
While the right to petition for a writ of habeas from a non-sovereign United States 
territory was explicitly rejected by the Supreme Court in Johnson, the scope has been 
redefined by a more recent Supreme Court decision, Rasul v. Bush.  In Rasul, the Court 
analyzed the right to petition for a writ of habeas corpus not from the petitioner’s 
perspective but from the perspective of the person responsible for the detention.  This 
means that the Court effectively bypassed the issue of whether or not Guantanamo Bay is 
United States Sovereign territory, and instead focused on the jurisdictional location of the 
person purported to be holding the prisoner unlawfully.224
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The court in Rasul ultimately held that “the Federal habeas statute conferred on 
the district court jurisdiction to hear the challenges of aliens who were captured abroad in 
connection with hostilities arising from the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks within 
the United States, and subject to executive detention at the United States Naval Base at 
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, to the legality of their detentions; even though Cuba had 
ultimate sovereignty over the naval base area leased from Cuba, the United States 
exercised plenary and exclusive jurisdiction over that territory.”225  Although this is the 
current Supreme Court ruling, the decision has been interpreted in various ways and it is 
unclear how the district courts will apply it.226  At the moment, Guantanamo detainees 
have no clearly defined right to petition for writs of habeas and although this right is what 
ultimately allowed Al-Hakim and Qassim to contest their detention after being found 
innocent.  There is a possibility that it could be revoked as a result of future litigation.227
While clearly the rights of detainees in Guantanamo, under either international 
humanitarian laws or domestic criminal laws, are in a state of flux, the Bush 
administration has created some measures through which detainees can seek relief such 
as Combatant Status Review Tribunals.228  On July 7, 2004, the Bush Administration 
determined that all detainees have a right to a military tribunal to contest their status as 
enemy combatants.229  Proponents of the CSRTs argue that trying terrorist matters in 
civilian courts would “expose civilian judges, jurors and courts to threats and reprisals 
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from terrorist groups,” while military commissions, “permit speedy, secure, fair and 
flexible proceedings, in a variety of locations, that would make it possible to minimize 
these risks.”230  In addition, military tribunals permit the use of confidential information 
and are not restricted by the rules of evidence, which allow the tribunals to hear all 
probative evidence.231  The current proposals suggest that: (1) CSRTs should be 
composed of three neutral commissioned officers, (2) detainees should be forewarned of 
the allegations against them (3) detainees should be provided an interpreter, (4) detainees 
must have permission to attend the hearing as well as testify on their behalf, and lastly 
and perhaps most important, (5) “preponderance of evidence shall be used in reaching 
[the determination of whether the detainee is properly detained as an enemy combatant], 
but there shall be a rebuttable presumption in favor of the Government’s evidence.”232
Although very few would argue that the conception of the military tribunal is 
inherently unconstitutional,233 the currently proposed tribunals have been under attack 
and it is unclear whether they will pass constitutional muster.234
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Proponents argue that CSRTs provide only a minimal level of due process for 
individuals.  They are not independent and impartial tribunals235 and they permit only a 
restrictive form of the right to counsel.236  In addition, they permit military jurisdiction 
over non-military criminal conduct, and do not grant Petitioners the right to appeal an 
unfavorable judgment.237  Lastly, and quite possibly most importantly, the standard and 
burden of proof requirement effectively requires the accused to prove that he is not an 
enemy combatant.238  As a result, the determinations made by the military commissions 
can produce false positives and negatives.239
As a result of this criticism, on November 7, 2005 the Supreme Court agreed to 
review a case regarding the constitutionality of Bush’s military tribunals.240  In the 
interim, however, the safeguards provided by this process are responsible for the 
determination of Al-Hakim’s and Qassim’s innocence.  These findings of innocence 
show the critical importance of maintaining at least the minimal protection offered by the 
CSRTs.
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Preserving Procedural Safeguards of Justice
Since September 11, 2001 combating terrorism has jumped to the forefront of the 
nation’s political agenda.241  In response to the attacks, the Bush administration was 
forced to act quickly.  Almost immediately it began implementing an anti-terrorism 
strategy that while quick and forceful, lacked legal standards of justice which are crucial 
to the success of such a strategy.242  The detention of innocent people, such as Al-Hakim 
and Qassim, provides an appropriate example of the adverse consequences of such 
actions, which in fact serve to decrease the overall safety of U.S. citizens.243  If we view 
national security in a broader sense, it is imperative that the Bush administration accounts 
for these injustices in waging its War on Terrorism and attempt to maintain “legal 
standards of fair treatment . . . to ensure the just and accurate determination of individual 
responsibility.”244
The Due Process clause of the fifth Amendment “is in many way the backbone of 
the rights guaranteed by the Constitution.”245  Detainees in Guantanamo like Al-Hakim 
and Qassim, are long-term prisoners “subject to comprehensive and unceasing control in 
every aspect of their lives by United States’ officials claiming justified authority over 
them by United States’ law.”246  The deprivation of life, liberty and property, even when 
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dealing with alleged terrorists, cannot go unchecked.247  Although there may be certain 
scenarios justifying the limitation of procedural safeguards for a short period of time for 
enemy combatants, such as in countries where war is rampant and compromises of 
certain rights may be unavoidable, Guantanamo Bay does not fit this exception.248
Depriving Guantanamo detainees of due process rights permits the Bush Administration 
“discretion to starve them, to beat them, to maim them, or to kill them, with or without 
hearings and with or without evidence of any wrongdoings.”249
A system, such as the one designed by the Bush Administration to fight terrorism, 
which does not integrate notions of due process and fairness, is likely to have high rates 
of error.250  As a result, many detainees have been released after months or years in 
confinement when the government has determined their innocence.251  Although the 
Administration argues that this demonstrates its willingness to correct its mistakes, it is 
arguable that simply releasing a detainee after potentially years of imprisonment, can 
never account for the grave injustice that person has faced, especially considering that our 
own government has determined they never should have been there in the first place.252
On this basis, Michael Ratner has argued:
Here were men who obviously should never have been taken to 
Guantanamo and yet they were imprisoned. Here were men who, had there 
been a hearing before some form of a tribunal, would have been freed long 
ago. Here were men, apparently released only because their government, a 
necessary ally of the United States in the War on Terrorism, insisted. 
There are surely many more such men suffering at Guantanamo. These 
stories of the innocent, of some detainees not involved in any fighting, of 
detainees that were no more then lowly foot soldiers, demonstrate the 
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importance of a legal process for determining the status of those 
imprisoned on Guantanamo. They demonstrate the wisdom of those who 
insist that the rule of law is a necessary component of human freedom.253
Mr. Abu Bakker Qassim, and Mr. A’del Abdu Al-Hakim are victims of this 
system.  Unfortunately, they have yet to be released from their imprisonment.  Here are 
men who have had a hearing in front of a CSRT and were found innocent; yet still remain 
in Guantanamo.  This is precisely why the need for due process is imperative to any 
criminal justice system.
What is Next for Abu Baker Qassim and A’del Abdu Al-Hakim 
While the government is willing to concede that the situation of Qassim and 
Al-Hakim is unfortunate, it has yet to provide a viable solution, and thus consequently, 
these two men remain imprisoned in Guantanamo.  While the problem these two men 
face is indicative of a larger, systematic problem, the solution could be simple.  These 
two men want to leave Guantanamo; they want their freedom and their liberty.  They 
want to be able to speak with their families without a third party censoring their 
conversation.  They want to eat their meals at their leisure.  The United States 
government has the ability to make this happen simply by permitting them to apply for 
asylum in the United States until replacement in a third country becomes practical.  Thus 
far, the government has refused to permit this.  In the last four years the United States 
government has permitted between 700,000 and 1,000,000 immigrants into this country, 
yet in the case of Al-Hakim and Qassim they are refusing to permit entry to two more 
immigrants.254
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Article 33(1) of the 1951 Refugee Convention forbids the United States from 
sending these two men back to China by stating that “no contracting state shall expel or 
return a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or 
freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of 
a particular social group, or political opinion.”255  The Uighur community in China faces 
systematic oppression and abuse from the Chinese government.  Repatriation would put 
these men in grave danger.256  Thus the only other viable solution is to send Al-Hakim 
and Qassim to a third country that is willing to grant them refugee status.  So far, 
however, the United States government has been unsuccessful in finding a country 
willing to grant them asylum, either through fear of political retaliation from the Chinese 
government, or from an unwillingness to believe that these men are truly innocent.257
The United States’ refusal to admit them into the United States further serves to solidify 
this doubt.
The right to “seek and enjoy” asylum in the United States is considered a 
fundamental right and is codified in many “legal instruments.”258  Although this right has 
clearly been diluted through domestic legislation and reform, the principles governing the 
laws of asylum are still central to our foreign policy and our concepts of human rights.259
The principles governing the right to asylum include but are not limited to the alleviation 
of global suffering, an appreciation for liberty and freedom, and a desire to create a 
global community that takes care of its members.260  What the Bush administration has 
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done to Al-Hakim and Qassim puts our purported commitment to these principles in 
serious question.  Unlawfully holding them in Guantanamo has already compromised 
their liberty and freedom, caused them massive emotional and physical suffering, and 
isolated them from their community.  Granting them asylum, under the circumstances, 
would only incrementally compensate for their injuries, but it is the least we can do.
Furthermore Al-Hakim and Qassim are ideal candidates for asylum.  According to 
the criteria for qualifying for asylum, petitioners must demonstrate that they fall within 
the statutory definition of a “refugee” and that they are eligible for asylum.  In addition, 
since ultimately the granting of asylum is a discretionary function, there are many other 
weighted factors that can contribute to the final determination.261
 The statutory definition of refugee under the Immigration and Nationality Act 
(INA) contains three elements: (1) the individual must seek protection outside of his/her 
country, (2) the individual must have a well-grounded fear of persecution and (3) the 
persecution must be based on race, religion, nationality, social group or political 
opinion.262  Because Al-Hakim and Qassim have been unlawfully imprisoned by the U.S. 
government in Guantanamo, they are clearly seeking asylum from outside their home 
country.263  Additionally, both men have a well grounded fear of persecution, which has 
been recognized by both international human rights groups and the U.S. Department of 
State, based on their social group and political opinions.264
The eligibility requirement, however, is where Al-Hakim and Qassim are barred 
from asylum.  In order to be asylum ready, an individual must be a non-citizen, who 
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arrives in the United States, who may not be returned safely to a third country.265  While 
both men are clearly non-citizens who cannot be repatriated to China, they are not 
technically in the United States.266   The jurisdictional requirement appears to be the only 
obstacle barring a successful asylum application.  Although one could clearly make the 
argument that Guantanamo Bay is in every practical sense a United States territory, the 
debate on Guantanamo jurisdictional identity has been currently stalled in the Supreme 
Court.267
Under current asylum law, “immigration judges have broad discretion to either 
grant or deny refugee asylum.”268  The immigration judge’s determinations are generally 
weighed using a “totality of circumstances” approach.269  Factors to be considered 
include, but are not limited to: (1) how many countries the immigrant passed through on 
his way to the United States (2) whether he could have remained in one of the other 
countries, (3) whether this is his first attempt at asylum in the United States, (4) and 
whether he committed fraud in coming to the United States.270 The judge may deny the 
claim if sufficient adverse factors seem to outweigh the fear of persecution,271 or may 
choose to disregard these factors and grant the claim using moral justifications.272
Regardless of the “adverse factors” that might favor deportation or denial of asylum, “the 
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danger of persecution should outweigh all but the most egregious adverse discretionary 
factors.”273
There is little doubt that granting Al- Hakim and Qassim asylum is the right thing 
for the government to do.  While there is absolutely no way to repay these men for what 
they have endured at the hands of the United State’s “War on Terrorism,” every single 
day that these men remain in Guantanamo, compounds the injustice they have faced.  The 
United States has an obligation to do everything in its power to compensate these men for 
their loses, which at the very least requires their immediate release from Guantanamo.      
Conclusion
The unjust detention of Al -Hakim and Qassim is illustrative of what happens 
when a society becomes so entrapped in its own fears that it allows the government to 
evade the normal procedural safeguards that provide the minimal but necessary 
protection for the wrongly accused.  In response to September 11 and the growing 
paranoia in the United States, the Bush administration has created a system to combat 
terrorism, which is designed to ensure quick and tangible results and immediately allay 
this country’s fear.  This type of system, however, creates a false sense of security, for 
while we are locking up innocent men, such as Al-Hakim and Qassim, we are permitting 
those who actually do pose a threat to the United States to go undetected.
In unfamiliar times such as these, where the U.S. feels the most insecure, the most 
vulnerable, it is important to ask ourselves how much are we willing to compromise in 
order to create the image of safety and security.  Would we be willing to compromise our 
own freedoms, our own liberties?  The imprisonment of innocent fathers, innocent 
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husbands, and innocent sons is not an acceptable compromise.  The Uighur community, 
an already vulnerable minority lacking in resources and security, deserves the protections 
that our criminal justice system is designed to safeguard.  The right to confront your 
accuser, the right to a fair and impartial trial, the right to due process, the right to petition 
for a writ of habeas, are all integral to preserving the integrity of the Bush 
Administration’s systematic War on Terrorism.  
Al-Hakim and Qassim are two of the many victims of this biased and unjust 
system.  They were simply in the wrong place at the wrong time and as a result have now 
lost four years of their lives and potentially more.  Although there is nothing that the 
Bush Administration can do to compensate these men for their injuries, it is unacceptable 
that they remain in Guantanamo.  
Despite the inadequacy of the system, Al-Hakim and Qassim have managed to 
voice their plight to the international community and prove their innocence.  Most 
Guantanamo detainees will not be so lucky.  The continued confinement of two foreign 
nationals, who the U.S. government recognizes as innocent, is a grave miscarriage of 
justice.  Short of releasing these men, there is little the Bush Administration can do to 
erase this embarrassing and horrific mistake.  The notion of due process, however, must 
be woven back into the War on Terrorism before other irrevocable miscarriages of justice 
occur.  
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